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The present electrophysiological study investigated the role of the need for cognitive
closure (NFC) in emotional processing. The NFC is conceptualized as an epistemic
motive that is related to how and why people seek out information in social
environments. Event-related potentials were recorded while individuals with high NFC
(i.e., low epistemic motivation) or low NFC (i.e., high epistemic motivation) performed a
modified Ultimatum Game, in which the emotions of happy or angry game agents were
employed to predict their most likely offer. High-NFC participants more closely adhered
to the decisions rules of the game than low-NFC individuals did. The electrophysiological
results showed that the dispositional NFC modified early perceptual components (N170,
N200, and P200). The potentials showed that high-NFC subjects had a processing bias
to angry faces, whereas low-NFC individuals exhibited no such effects. These findings
indicated that high-NFC individuals were more sensitive to negative emotional stimuli
than low-NFC individuals in an interpersonal decision-making task.
Keywords: epistemic motivation, need for cognitive closure, emotional facial displays, interpersonal
decision-making, ERP
Introduction
Previous studies have reported that individuals diﬀer in their dispositional need for cognitive
closure (NFC; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). The NFC is conceptualized as an epistemic motive
that is related to how and why people seek out information in their social environments (Calogero
et al., 2009) and that varies in individuals according to their motivation for information processing
and judgment (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994; Kossowska, 2007; Chirumbolo and Leone, 2008).
The NFC is deﬁned as the tendency to reduce experiences of discomfort that are generated by
uncertainty and the desire to ﬁnd a deﬁnitive answer to a question (Kruglanski and Webster,
1996). The NFC is a dimension of stable individual disposition (Webster and Kruglanski, 1998;
Kruglanski, 2004). High-NFC people have an aversion for ambiguity and therefore low epistemic
motivation. These people can be characterized as having preferences for quick decision-making,
order, and predictability and as closed-minded (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). In contrast,
low-NFC individuals show a higher tolerance for ambiguity and therefore have high epistemic
motivation. They prefer slow decision-making, uncertainty, variety, and openness. The NFC
is assumed to instill two general and sequential tendendcies in decision-making: urgency and
permanence. The ﬁrst stage of this process refers to the inclination to quickly determine an answer.
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High-NFC individuals feel anxious when there is a postponement
of the completion of a decision. The second stage preserves the
decision by freezing on the acquired structure. The desire of these
individuals for permanency lies in the avoidance of their return
to uncertainty if the decision is reconsidered. Thus, high-NFC
people tend to reject new information after they have reached a
decision.
Facial displays of emotions play an essential role in
interpersonal interactions. Research on emotional contagion has
reported that emotional displays can evoke aﬀective reactions
in others (Hatﬁeld et al., 1992). In addition, humans engage
in frequent anticipation or prediction of the behavior of others
(Frith and Frith, 2007), and facial emotional displays are
an important source of these predictions (see, for example,
Ekman and Friesen, 2003; Alguacil et al., 2015). Emotional
displays help individuals gather information about the emotions,
beliefs, and future intentions of others, as well as appraise
the current situation, and serve as tools for coordinating
interactions (Keltner and Haidt, 1999). The action tendencies
of cooperation and competition are thus mainly built on social
judgments (Forgas, 1991) and predictions (Frith and Frith,
2007).
Previous investigations have suggested that people with low
epistemic motivation directly base their behavior on their
aﬀective state that is evoked by the emotional displays of others
(Van Kleef et al., 2009). Hence, in the current investigation, we
explored the eﬀects of emotional displays during interpersonal
decisions in people with high vs. low needs for closure. We
employed a modiﬁed Ultimatum Game (UG) that was developed
by Ruz and Tudela (2011) and that integrates the interpersonal
interaction factor with the perception of emotional facial
expressions. The UG is often used to investigate interpersonal
interactions. In the original game, one player (the proposer, who
will be named agent hereafter) allocates money to himself/herself
and to another player (the responder). The responder can
either accept or reject the oﬀer. If the responder accepts, both
players win their respective amounts, but if the responder
rejects the oﬀer, they both receive nothing. The game results
show that people reject a high proportion of unfair oﬀers,
which does not correspond with a rational perspective (Camerer,
2003).
In the modiﬁed UG that was employed in the current study,
the participants always played the role of responder. They were
required to use the emotions of happiness and anger that were
conveyed by the agent to predict their likely future oﬀer (good
or bad). Some of the agents were trustworthy, while others were
untrustworthy. The trustworthy agents’ emotions indicated their
natural consequences so that a smiling expression meant that the
oﬀer would likely be good, whereas an angry face meant that the
oﬀer was most likely bad. However, the untrustworthy agents’
emotions indicated the opposite meanings. The predictions of
the cue and the emotional expression of the target were valid
in 80% of the trials, which rendered the decision situation
uncertain.
We aimed to test two hypotheses with this task. First, because
high-NFC individuals have a clear tendency to adhere to norms
(Fu et al., 2007), we hypothesized that they would be more
inﬂuenced by the probabilities of the decision rule or the
predictions that were generated by the combination of the cue
and the emotional expression of the target, which were valid in
80% of the trials, compared with low-NFC individuals. Second,
based on the ﬁndings of previous studies (Van Kleef, 2009; Van
Kleef et al., 2010), we predicted that people with high-NFC would
be more sensitive to displays of anger. Compared with people
with high epistemic motivation, individuals with low epistemic
motivation are more inﬂuenced by the aﬀective reactions that
are elicited by the angry expressions of other people (Van Kleef
et al., 2009). In our study, we hypothesized that the NFC
would inﬂuence the electrophysiological processing of negative
emotional information when people responded to an agent in
interpersonal contexts. We therefore focused our analyses on
the potentials that reﬂect emotional and attentional processing.
First, previous studies have shown that the N170 component
is modiﬁed by negative facial expressions (Blau et al., 2007;
Krombholz et al., 2007). In these studies, the N170 amplitudes
were larger in response to angry faces compared to happy faces
(Blau et al., 2007; Krombholz et al., 2007; see also Tortosa et al.,
2013). Second, the results of Campanella et al. (2002) suggest that
the N200 component is sensitive to the presentation of negative
facial expressions and may signal a change of attention toward
biologically signiﬁcant events. Other studies have also shown
that the N200 is sensitive to the presentation of negative facial
expressions and other negative emotional information (Eimer
and Holmes, 2002; Kanske and Kotz, 2010; Ruz et al., 2012).
Third, the P200 potential is associated with the processing of
negative emotional stimuli (Schutter et al., 2004). In some studies,
this component has been found to be larger for negative than for
positive stimuli (Carretié et al., 2001; Delplanque et al., 2004).
Fourth, the N300 is a negative deﬂection that is sensitive to
emotional stimuli (Carretié et al., 1997). Previous studies have
reported that angry facial expressions generate a larger N300 than
happy ones (Schutter et al., 2004; Ruz et al., 2012). Last, several
studies have reported a larger late positive potential (LPP) in
response to emotional relative to neutral stimuli (e.g., Schupp
et al., 2000; Carretié et al., 2001). Such patterns have been
interpreted as indicative of the deeper processing of information
and greater allocation of attentional resources to emotional
stimuli. Hence, we hypothesized that high-NFC individuals
would show heightened electrophysiological diﬀerences between
happy and angry faces in the aforementioned components.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were selected from a pool of 111 Chinese
undergraduates. All were native Mandarin speakers, with no
neurological or psychological disorders, and with (corrected to)
normal color vision. Written informed consent was obtained
after detailed explanation of the experiment. The study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of Southwest University.
Participants were divided into two groups on the basis of
their score of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCS).
The ERP experiments included 14 participants in high-NFC
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(mean age = 21.5, 4 males) and 14 subjects in low-NFC (mean
age = 21.7, 1 male)1.
Measures
In our study, NFC was measured with the Chinese version (Liu
et al., 2007) of the Webster and Kruglanski (1994) scale. Accurate
translation ensured that the Chinese version was consistent with
the original version. The scale has a high test–retest reliability
(r = 0.8611) observed over a 12–13 week period, which indicates
that the personality construct it taps is relatively stable (Webster
and Kruglanski, 1994). Also, the scale has received conﬁrmation
and cross-cultural validation in a series of investigations (Chiu
et al., 2000; Moneta and Yip, 2004; Kossowska, 2007). Subjects
answered the questionnaire by responding to a 6-point scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). As the
original scale, the Chinese version is a 47-item questionnaire.
Subjects’ total score is calculated by summing the scores of 42
items, and the remaining ﬁve questions are used to obtain a lie
index. Additional analyses indicated that the Chinese version
of NFCS also possesses high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α = 0.77).
Fourteen participants whose scores were above the 75th
percentile of the NFC distribution (score exceeding 172) were
classiﬁed as high-NFC, and 14 subjects whose scores were below
the 25th percentile (score below 142) were classiﬁed as low-NFC.
All of them participated in the electrophysiological experiment.
Stimuli and Procedure
Our experiment contained three blocks (forty trials each; 120
trials in total). After the ﬁrst ﬁxation point (+; 1◦ × 1◦) was
presented with a variable 1000–1500 ms duration, the cue (either
a triangle or a circle, 2◦ × 2◦ approximately) appeared at the
center of the screen for 500 ms, followed by a variable inter-
stimulus interval displaying another ﬁxation point for 1000–
1500 ms. Afterward the face of the agent (5◦ × 6◦) was presented
for 500 ms, followed by another ﬁxation point (1◦ × 1◦) lasting
between 1000 and 1500 ms. Then, the words “please make
a choice” were presented. Participants made their decision by
pressing the appropriate button (1 or 2 keys on the keyboard)
during the choice time. This time period was limited to 10 s2. The
oﬀer (3.5◦ × 1.5◦) was presented for 500 ms immediately after
subject responded.
The 120 faces were divided into 60 angry (50% female, 50%
male) and 60 happy expressions (50% female, 50% male) taken
from the Chinese Facial Aﬀective Picture System (CAPS; Wang
and Luo, 2005). These faces were presented in random order,
and were similar in perceptual intensity (mean: angry = 5.58,
happy = 5.66; t(59) = 1.129, p= 0.263; Chinese Aﬀective Picture
System; Wang and Luo, 2005).
Participants received the instruction that the agents
in the game had completed a questionnaire related to
1Although groups did not have a matching number of female and male
participants, previous studies suggest that gender does not aﬀect individuals’ score
on the NFCS (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994).
2We gave plenty of time to subjects to decide with the goal of avoiding a potential
inﬂuence of time pressure on the need for cognitive closure (NFC). The following
slide appeared immediately after participants responded.
trustworthiness. Some agents were trustworthy while the
others were untrustworthy. Participants could judge how
trustworthy the agents were on the basis of the cue presented at
the beginning of every trial. If the agent was trustworthy, a circle
(triangle) would be presented. Or if the agent was untrustworthy,
a triangle (circle) would appear. The trustworthy agent smile
implied that the oﬀer was probably good for the participant and
an angry expression meant that the oﬀer was probably bad. On
the contrary, the untrustworthy agent smile meant that the oﬀer
was probably bad, whereas an angry expression indicated that
the oﬀer was probably good. The validity of this information was
80% (that is, the situation was uncertain). Thus, oﬀers were good
to the subjects in 80% of the trials in which a trustworthy agent
smiled or an untrustworthy agent was angry. On the other hand,
oﬀers were bad in 80% of the trials in which a trustworthy agent
had an angry face or an untrustworthy agent smiled. Participants
were asked to use the combined information of the cue and the
emotional expression of the agent to predict their most likely
oﬀer and either accept or reject it before the actual oﬀer was
presented. Once the participant decided, the oﬀer was displayed.
If the participant accepted the oﬀer, the money would be divided
as proposed and the agent and participant would win their
respective amounts. If the participant rejected the oﬀer, instead,
none of them obtained anything for that trial. The responder’s
goal was to gain more money than the agents. Participants
completed a short training session (10 trials) before performing
the main experiment. The training task had the same parameters
as the main task except the faces (which were another 10 facial
photographs). The sequence of events in a trial is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Extraneous variables in our study were strictly controlled. (1)
The meaning of the trustworthiness cue was counterbalanced
across participants. (2) The numbers in the oﬀers were taken
from 1 to 9 and separated by a slash. The diﬀerence between
the two numbers was always 1. The color of the number, which
was assigned to the participant, was blue (red) and the other
number, which was assigned to the agent, was red (blue). The
color distribution was counterbalanced across participants. (3)
The location and color of the highest number were matched
across trials. There were 32 diﬀerent oﬀers.
Electrophysiological Recording and Analysis
Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded from 64 scalp
sites using tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap (Brain
Products), with the reference on the left and right mastoids
and a ground electrode on the medial frontal aspect. The
vertical electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded with electrodes
placed above and below the left eye. The horizontal EOG
was recorded as the left versus right orbital rim. All electrode
impedances were maintained below 5 K. The EEG and
EOG were ampliﬁed using a 0.05∼100 Hz band pass and
continuously digitized at 500 Hz/channel. ERP averages were
computed oﬀ-line. Eye movement artifacts (eye blinks and
movements) were excluded oﬄine. Trials with EOG artifacts
(EOG voltage exceeding ±80 μV), ampliﬁer clipping and peak-
to-peak deﬂection exceeding ±80 μV were excluded from
averaging. All other trials satisfying these thresholds were
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FIGURE 1 | Demonstration of sequence of events in a trial (take angry face condition for example).
included in the averages. The data were baseline-corrected with
respect to the pre-stimulus (face) interval of 200 ms. ERP
waveforms were time-locked to the onset of the face and the
average epoch was 700 ms, including a 200 ms pre-stimulus
baseline.
We selected electrode sites for statistical analysis according to
previous studies. For the N170, only the PO4 electrode where the
most prominent N170 potential was observed in all conditions
was analyzed (same site as Ibáñez et al., 2012). For the N200, the
following ﬁve electrodes were analyzed: FCZ, FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4
(ﬁve frontal sites, consistent with Yuan et al., 2007). For the P200,
we employed the following electrodes: CPZ, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4
(ﬁve central sites, based on Jessen and Kotz, 2011). And for the
N300 and LPP we selected the following electrodes: FZ, F1, F2,
F3, F4, and CZ, C1, C2, C3, C4 (ﬁve frontal sites and ﬁve central
sites, based on Schupp et al., 2000; Schutter et al., 2004). The
mean amplitudes of the N170 (150–200 ms), N200 (200–250 ms),
P200 (250–300 ms), N300 (300–350 ms), and LPP (350–500 ms)
components were measured and analyzed.
The average number of trials per condition entered in the
electrophysiological analysis was 30. The present study focused
on the relationship between NFC and emotional displays, and
therefore, we did not add the trustworthiness factor to the
electrophysiological analysis to simplify the design. Adding the
trustworthiness variable to the electrophysiological ANOVA did
not bring any additional insight into the relationship between
NFC and emotional processing, and thus we decided not to
include it for the sake of clarity. ERP data was analyzed by
means of a 2 × 2 × 5 ANOVA with Group as a between-
participants factor (high-NFC vs. low-NFC) and Emotion (angry,
happy) and ﬁve electrode sites as within-participants factors. To
analyze the N170, we used a 2 × 2 ANOVA3. The degrees of
freedom were corrected according to the Greenhouse–Geisser
3The analysis of the N170 is a 2 × 2 ANOVA because the number of the electrode
is only one.
method. Whenever signiﬁcant eﬀects were revealed in the
ANOVA, subsequent ANOVAs and least signiﬁcant diﬀerence
(LSD) tests were applied to identify the sources of main eﬀects
and interactions.
Results
Behavioral Performance
All trials were included in the analysis of reaction times (RTs)4.
RTs data was analyzed by means of a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with the
between group factor Group and Emotion and Trustworthiness
as within-subject factors. The ANOVA indicated a main eﬀect
of emotion, F(1,26) = 13.62, p < 0.01, as the RT was longer in
the angry (Mangry = 902.12, SD = 101.02) than in the happy
condition (Mhappy = 755.87, SD= 74.10). Responses were slower
for untrustworthy (M = 918.76, SD= 99.10) than for trustworthy
agents (M = 739.23, SD = 74.83), F(1,26) = 31.62, p < 0.001.
The interaction between trustworthiness and emotion was also
signiﬁcant, F(1,26) = 9.25, p < 0.01. The results showed that
the diﬀerence between the two types of emotion was larger in
the trustworthy [F(1,26) = 19.02, p < 0.001; Mangry = 850.18,
SD = 94.27; M happy = 628.29, SD = 60.05] than in the
untrustworthy [F(1,26) = 2.79, p = 0.107; Mangry = 954.06,
SD = 108.79,Mhappy = 883.46, SD = 93.29] condition.
Regarding participants’ choices, we found that high-NFC
subjects rejected the oﬀers at a signiﬁcantly higher rate (12.5%)
than low-NFC group (6%) in the trustworthy-happy condition,
and accepted the oﬀers at a signiﬁcantly higher rate (19.6%) than
low-NFC individuals (3.9%) in the trustworthy-angry condition
(trustworthy-happy: χ2(1) = 10.86, p < 0.01; trustworthy-angry:
χ2(1) = 44.18, p < 0.001). These eﬀects were not signiﬁcant in
the untrustworthy situation (untrustworthy-happy: χ2(1) = 3.32,
p = 0.069; untrustworthy-angry: χ2(1) = 1.95, p = 0.162).
4There are no trials in which no responses occurred.
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Electrophysiological Data
N170
As shown in Figure 2, the N170 component peaked at 170 ms.
The ANOVA indicated a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of emotion,
F(1,26) = 21.51, p < 0.001. The amplitude of this potential was
larger for happy (M = −2.06; SD = 1.82) than for angry faces
(M = −0.79; SD = 1.80). We also found a signiﬁcant interaction
involving Group and Emotion, F(1,26) = 6.09, p < 0.05. The
results showed that the N170 of high-NFC participants was more
positive for angry compared to happy faces, F(1,26) = 25.25,
p < 0.001. This eﬀect was absent in the low-NFC, F(1,26) = 2.35,
p = 0.137 (for details about amplitudes see Table 1).
N200
Figure 3 shows grand-averaged ERPs in response to diﬀerent
emotional faces. The N200 peaked at a mean latency of 240 ms.
The ANOVA conducted on N200 amplitudes yielded a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of Emotion, F(1,26) = 14.24, p < 0.01. Angry faces
elicited more positive amplitudes (M = 3.69; SD = 1.13) than
happy faces (M = 2.57; SD = 1.04). There was also a signiﬁcant
interaction between Group and Emotion, F(1,26) = 4.36,
p < 0.05. Individuals with high-NFC displayed an N200 of
more positive amplitude to the angry compared to the happy
face, F(1,26) = 17.18, p < 0.001, whereas the N200 of low-
NFC subjects showed no amplitude diﬀerence between the
two conditions [F(1,26) = 1.42, p = 0.244; for details about
amplitudes see Table 1].
P200
Figure 4 displays the P200, which peaked at a mean latency of
270 ms. The ANOVA on the averaged amplitudes of this potential
showed that there was nomain eﬀect of Emotion [F(1,26)= 2.33,
p = 1.139]. The interaction between Emotion and Group was
signiﬁcant, F(1,26)= 4.43, p< 0.05. In the same line as before, the
P200 of high-NFC participants displayed enhanced amplitudes to
angry faces compared to happy ones, F(1,26) = 6.59, p < 0.05.
However, low-NFC participants showed no diﬀerence in P200
TABLE 1 | Mean N170, N200, and P200 amplitudes (M) and SD for the
angry and happy faces in each group.
Measure High-NFC Low-NFC
N170
Angry 1.167 (7.828) −2.743 (10.983)
Happy −0.783 (7.487)∗∗ −3.339 (11.332)
N200
Angry 2.864 (4.069) 4.524 (7.255)
Happy 1.118 (3.524)∗∗ 4.022 (6.814)
P200
Angry 5.885 (6.03) 8.222 (7.91)
Happy 4.267 (5.387)∗ 8.479 (7.838)
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
amplitudes in the two conditions (F < 1; for details about
amplitudes see Table 1).
N300
N300 amplitudes showed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Emotion
(F < 1). The interaction between Emotion and Group was not
signiﬁcant either (F < 1).
Late Positive Potential
Late positive potential amplitudes showed no signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of Emotion, F(1, 26) = 3.416, p = 0.076 (Mhappy = 8.67,
SD= 1.232;Mangry = 9.17, SD= 1.273). The interaction between
Emotion and Group was not signiﬁcant either, F(1,26) = 3.738,
p = 0.064.
Discussion
In the present study, we employed an economic game in
which agents displayed emotional faces to examine how high-
and low-NFC individuals process emotional facial displays
in interpersonal contexts. Our behavioral results showed that
participants took longer to respond to angry compared to happy
FIGURE 2 | Grand average ERP waveforms at PO4 for angry (solid lines) and happy (dashed lines) faces for the high-NFC and low-NFC groups.
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FIGURE 3 | Grand average ERP waveforms at FCZ, FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4 for angry (solid lines) and happy (dashed lines) faces for the high-NFC and
low-NFC group.
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FIGURE 4 | Grand average ERP waveforms at CPZ, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4 for angry (solid lines) and happy (dashed lines) faces for the high-NFC and
low-NFC group.
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faces and that they were slower to respond to untrustworthy
than to trustworthy agents, regardless of their NFC psychological
disposition. The diﬀerence in the responses to angry faces
and happy faces was greater in the trustworthy condition
compared with the untrustworthy condition. These behavioral
results were consistent with the results of the study by Ruz and
Tudela (2011). Previous studies have suggested that increased
attentional resources are devoted to negative events because
negative information may be a symbol of a potential danger and
that this diﬀerence was evolutionally acquired (Carretié et al.,
2001; Campanella et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2011). However, it is
also common to observe slower responses to displays of anger,
and this could possibly be related to the avoidance tendencies that
they elicit (Marsh et al., 2005).
In the analysis of the frequency of choices (accept or reject) in
the trustworthy situation, we found that high-NFC participants
were more inﬂuenced by the probabilities of the decision rule
(that is, the information about the most likely oﬀer that was
provided by the combination of the cue and facial expression
information, which was valid on 80% of the trials) than low-
NFC subjects were. The rate of acceptance of the high-NFC
participants matched the probabilities of the feedback more
closely than the decisions of the low-NFC individuals. When the
agents were trustworthy and happy, high-NFC individuals chose
to reject the oﬀer at a signiﬁcantly higher rate than the low-
NFC group did. In addition, when the agents were trustworthy
and angry, high-NFC individuals chose to accept the oﬀer at a
signiﬁcantly higher rate than low-NFC individuals did.
In the electrophysiological analyses, we found that high-
NFC individuals showed heightened diﬀerences between facial
emotional expressions, which were evidenced by diﬀerences in
the N170, N200, and P200 amplitudes for angry vs. happy agents,
and these diﬀerences were not observed in low-NFC participants.
N170
The N170 component is a reliable index of the initial stages
of facial feature coding (Blau et al., 2007; Wronka and
Walentowska, 2011). Negative emotions tend to generate larger
N170 amplitudes compared to positive ones (Krombholz et al.,
2007). However, some previous studies failed to ﬁnd this
eﬀect (Eimer et al., 2003; Holmes et al., 2003). A number of
studies have claimed that the N170 component reﬂects the
early structural processing of faces and that it is unaﬀected by
emotional expression (Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000). The
results of our study suggested that the N170 component reﬂected
the emotion that was displayed by the agents’ face. However,
participants in the high-NFC group showed a reverse pattern
in that the N170 component exhibited smaller amplitudes in
response to angry versus happy faces. The amplitude of a positive
component may indicate the amount of processing resources
that subjects allocate to a task, and studies have found that
negative components sometimes display a reversal in this pattern
(Mecklinger et al., 1992). In fact, Aranda et al. (2010) found that
the N170 component displays an inverted pattern for the validity
of faces, in which validly cued faces resulted in less amplitude
than invalid faces, and attentional enhancements were observed
in the RTs. Therefore, the observed pattern may indicate that
high-NFC individuals are more sensitive to negative emotional
information (angry faces) in contrast to low-NFC subjects during
interpersonal decisions.
N200
Previous studies have shown that the N200 component is
sensitive to the presentation of negative facial expressions and
negative emotional information (Campanella et al., 2002; Eimer
and Holmes, 2002; Kanske and Kotz, 2010; Ruz et al., 2012).
In the present study, high-NFC individuals showed smaller
N200 amplitudes in response to negative faces compared to
positive ones. This phenomenon was consistent with the results
reported by Pérez-Edgar and Fox (2003). Previous studies
have reported that, compared with people with high epistemic
motivation, individuals with low epistemic motivation may be
more inﬂuenced by the aﬀective reactions that are elicited by
the angry expressions of other people (Van Kleef et al., 2009).
Combined with this ﬁnding, the N200 results suggested that
high-NFC people were more sensitive to negative faces than
positive emotional faces in interpersonal decisions. These results
suggest that high-NFC individuals easily exhibit negative aﬀective
reactions in response to others’ anger.
P200
The P200 component may index the evaluation and processing
of emotional information, and it provides evidence that the
emotional modulation of attention happens extremely rapidly
in response to socially and emotionally salient stimuli, such as
faces (Dennis and Chen, 2007). The P200 component may also
be an index of negative evaluations (Carretié et al., 2001; Yuan
et al., 2007), threat-related attentional biases (Bar-Haim et al.,
2005), negative biases (Huang and Luo, 2006), the detection of
extremely dangerous features (Correll et al., 2006), and cognitive
resource occupancy (Fabiani et al., 2000). Our results in the
P200 component revealed a bias toward the enhanced processing
of angry expressions in the high-NFC subjects but not in
the low-NFC subjects, which was shown by the enhancement
of this potential in response to angry faces in the former
group. This eﬀect may be a threat-related attentional bias that
is associated with the relationship between NFC and anxiety.
Previous research reports that cognitive closure is associated with
an insecure attachment style (Mikulincer, 1997). Individuals with
insecure attachment are more readily threatened by information
that challenges their knowledge structures, especially when they
are being emotionally overwhelmed (Mikulincer, 1997). They
may anxiously hold on to their initial knowledge constructions
when they experience emotional dysregulation (Fonagy and
Allison, 2014). In addition, Roets and Van Hiel (2008) found that
decision-making acts as a stressor for high NFC individuals. The
increased levels of negative arousal in response to anxiety or stress
that occur in these individuals could explain why they are more
sensitive to negative emotional information during interpersonal
decision-making.
N300 and LPP
It is noteworthy that there were no signiﬁcant interactions
between the NFC and the valence of emotions in the N300
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and LPP components, which are the later components.
This phenomenon suggested that the NFC aﬀects only the
earlier processing stages of facial emotional processing. The
later stages appear to be independent of this dispositional
factor.
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, we
did not control for the participants’ intelligence levels nor
their socio-economic status. Future studies should control these
factors, and this will make the results more valid. Second, the
level of uncertainty was not manipulated in the present study.
Thus, we could not compare the observed eﬀects in high-
vs. low-certainty conditions. This manipulation is needed in
a future study. Additional studies can use this approach to
investigate whether an uncertainty in context arouses feelings
of negative emotional experiences in high-NFC individuals. In
addition, the mixed eﬀects in previous literature regarding the
modulation of emotional valence on ERP amplitudes show that
this phenomenon is not fully understood. In this sense, the
current results only represent a step forward providing additional
evidence to the ﬁeld.
Despite these limitations, the present study suggests that high-
NFC individuals have a negative bias toward processing anger
in interpersonal decisions. The high-NFC subjects showed a
processing bias to angry faces compared to happy ones, which
was evidenced in the N170\N200\P200 potentials. Van Kleef et al.
(2009) found that people with low epistemic motivation exhibit
negative aﬀective reactions in response to others’ anger. Our
ﬁndings were in agreement with this, and these results have
implications for theories on emotional contagion (Van Kleef,
2009; Van Kleef et al., 2009). The results reported here add
electrophysiological evidence to the results of previous studies
that have shown that individuals with low epistemic motivation
exhibit heightened aﬀective reactions in response to emotional
faces (Van Kleef et al., 2009, 2010) and suggest that these reactions
could be mediated by the attentional enhancement of emotional
processing.
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